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Most political scientists would agree that the overriding goal 
of political science is to explain political events. More specifi-
cally, whether one is interested in studying the outbreak of war, 
voting behavior in legislatures, or the effect of elections on the 
economy, the aim is to explain as much of the variance in these 
events as possible. Political scientists educated in this tradition 
generally shy away from making normative arguments, as such 
work does not fall under the heading of "good social science." 
The essays in A New Constitutionalism represent nothing 
less than an attempt to redirect the enterprise of political science 
toward a different goal. Many of the authors of these essays are 
members of the Committee on the Political Economy of the 
Good Society (PEGS), whose members share the conviction that 
social scientists should focus on "how political institutions work 
and can be made to work, how they may be assembled into the 
larger wholes of political regimes, and why some regimes are bet-
ter than others." Their goal in this book is to advance the cause 
of a "practical political science," one which focuses on enhancing 
the ability of citizens and politicians to design institutions to 
achieve valued goals. The authors thus seek to sway those of us 
who believe the goal of social science is, and should be, to ex-
plain and understand the world of politics. 
The book proceeds in three sections. In the opening section, 
the book's editors, Karol Edward Soltan and Stephen L. Elkin, 
attempt to spell out what is meant by a "New Constitutionalism." 
The second section consists of essays which focus on different 
varieties of constitutionalist theory. All of the authors in this sec-
tion clearly accept the idea that a focus on a New Constitutional-
ism is needed, although each author differs in his conception of 
what the essential features of this approach ought to be. Finally, 
in the book's concluding section, three authors use the political 
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regime of the United States to illustrate some of the concerns of 
the New Constitutionalism. 
The first section, with its overview essays by Soltan and El-
kin, provides a nice overview of the goals of the book and of 
PEGS. The primary purpose of these initial chapters is to set the 
table for the following essays-that is, to provide a bit of a road 
map for those of us who are unfamiliar with this research agenda. 
To do so, the authors first seek to explain what is meant by the 
New Constitutionalism. Along similar lines, they seek to detail 
the development of a concern for a New Constitutionalism-that 
is, to show its intellectual antecedents. Finally, they set out a list 
of questions that such an approach will need to address if it is to 
be successful. 
Soltan's essay addresses the question: What is the New Con-
stitutionalism? He begins by drawing the connection between 
the New Constitutionalism and other approaches, such as critical 
theory, reconstructive theory, political economy, and theories of 
law. He then moves on to draw distinctions between this and 
more traditional constitutionalism. First, he argues that the new 
approach, unlike the old, is interdisciplinary. Second, he notes 
that in contrast to much of contemporary social science, the New 
Constitutionalism aspires to prescribe as well as to describe and 
explain. Finally, Sol tan identifies the following as the main 
themes of the New Constitutionalism: it points out the inade-
quacy of other narrower conceptions of institutional design 
which do not ask us to. consider institutions as preference-form-
ers but rather treat institutions as mere instruments of existing 
preferences; its goal of institutional design takes into account the 
basic limits of human nature, to avoid the application of inade-
quate or unrealistic prescription; and finally, it recognizes the in-
adequacy of various narrow conceptions of human motivation-
for example, perspectives on institutional design that either ne-
glect the possibility of self-interest or rely entirely on it. 
The more important of the two introductory chapters is El-
kin's. It is Elkin who most directly addresses the notion that we 
should be moving toward a "practical" political science, one 
which would have at its heart the design of institutions that form 
a desirable political regime. Elkin argues that this is not a new 
concern, but rather, by addressing matters other than explana-
tion and evaluation, is a return to earlier modes of political sci-
ence that focused on constitutions. He provides a very nice and 
clear overview of previous strands of constitutionalist thought, 
including the classical tradition (and its reformulations) and so-
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cial choice theory. While the review he provides is not enough to 
give an unfamiliar reader a deep understanding, it is certainly 
enough to orient such a reader with some basic themes and ideas. 
What is unique about this new approach to constitutional-
ism? The main difference, according to Elkin, is that traditional 
constitutional social science, while concerned with designing in-
stitutions and constitutions that create and improve regimes, con-
centrates almost exclusively on limiting the exercise of political 
power. The New Constitutionalism, on the other hand, must ad-
dress several other important questions. To begin with, how can 
we use government for enhancing social welfare and at the same 
time reduce arbitrariness in the exercise of the power to do so 
(i.e., can government be both limited and purposive)? Further-
more, what sort of individual character should political institu-
tions foster? (His answer is "the kind of character that is 
necessary for the proper functioning of a constitutional regime.") 
Elkin also asserts that the New Constitutionalism must recognize 
that one cannot look at each institution independently but needs 
to look at them interdependently. Finally, he contends that the 
most fundamental question is whether its very concern for polit-
ical design and the creation of good political regimes can be de-
fended. Are human beings even capable of such large scale 
designs? He allows that an individual at a given point in time is 
not, but that citizens over a long period of time are, and thus the 
problem can be approached iteratively. 
While these two chapters successfully illustrate some out-
lines of a practical political science, there are a few problems that 
arise here. A minor point is that Soltan provides no evidence for 
his claim that the New Constitutionalism is more interdiscipli-
nary than previous approaches. A more major point, and one 
that is common to later chapters, is that the authors understate 
the role that other scholars have assigned to institutions. Many 
scholars, including those ascribing to rational choice methods, 
have seen institutions not only as instruments of existing prefer-
ences but also as preference-formers and as interconnected parts 
of the government, parts that should not be studied in isolation. 
Recent work along these lines, including books and articles by 
Knott and Miller, McCubbins, Noll and Weingast, Moe, and 
others, is ignored by the chapters in this book. This is problem-
atic, as these works often point out that choosing a "best" institu-
tion is often impossible because of political constraints and 
incentives. 
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The middle section of the book, as noted earlier, presents 
different varieties of constitutionalist theory. The four chapters 
in this section show the variety of opinions and approaches which 
can be listed under the tent of New Constitutionalism. 
The least satisfying of these chapters is James Ceaser's. 
Ceaser argues that the sole reasons for acquiring knowledge in 
political science should be to determine whether or not a regime 
is good and how to make it better. Echoing some of the com-
ments of earlier chapters, he asserts that this harkens back to the 
concerns of traditional political science. This chapter has some 
good descriptions of the science of politics and the historical de-
velopment of schools of thought such as pluralism and rational 
choice, but in the end it fails to be convincing, in part because of 
its ad hominem attacks on such earlier approaches. While it does 
point out some legitimate failings of these approaches, it is so 
vague about the alternatives that it fails to persuade the reader 
that there is anything systematic or specific to be said about New 
Constitutionalism. 
Also in this section, Soltan and Elkin each pick up on and 
expand some of the themes they introduced in the opening es-
says. Soltan, for example, delves further into the meanings and 
background of the study of constitutions and argues for a "ge-
neric constitutionalism," which "takes in new directions the basic 
idea of limiting power in the service of moral and political ideals 
not just within the state, but also in private organizations and 
bargaining." Elkin uses his chapter to discuss the flaws in con-
temporary constitutional thought-most centrally, that it "has an 
incomplete understanding of political institutions and sees them 
as essentially practical devices for limiting the arbitrary exercise 
of political power" -and to propose that constitutions must also 
help form the character of the citizenry and facilitate intelligent 
social problem solving. 
Finally, Charles Anderson presents a detailed discussion of 
the differences between "pragmatic liberalism" and "classical lib-
eralism." The latter suffers from several problems, he maintains, 
most serious of which is its insistence on the most strenuous 
ground rules for the justification of principles before undertaking 
collective action, an insistence which places an almost impossible 
burden of proof on the proponents of collective action. Ander-
son points out that we do not always know our principles in ad-
vance, and that we do not have perennial debates over 
constitutional principles. He argues that instead we should be 
guided by pragmatic liberalism, which developed out of criticisms 
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of classical liberalism. Pragmatic liberalism avoids the excessive 
individualism and atomistic logic of classical liberalism, and ar-
gues that there is indeed a role for public intervention in private 
institutions. Central to this idea is the "community of inquiry," 
whereby public ideals arise "from a sustained, open, critical, self-
conscious consideration of the best way of achieving a social pur-
pose." This extension of classical liberalism, which echoes the 
work of Alan Stone (e.g., Public Service Liberalism) and Cass 
Sunstein in its emphases on governmental intervention into the 
economy and the importance of deliberation, is worthwhile 
reading. 
The final section contains three essays of widely varying na-
tures. First, Theodore Lowi reiterates the theme which he has 
sounded time and again, a theme first outlined in Grant McCon-
nell's Private Power and American Democracy-that the contin-
ual expansion of national government has been accompanied by 
a yielding of control over public policy to special interests. It is, 
as Lowi writes, a visit to the same well, which is now unfortu-
nately deeper and more polluted than when he first began to 
write on this topic. Lowi takes this opportunity to address those, 
such as Richard Stewart and Ernest Gellhorn, who have criti-
cized his earlier works. In an interesting addition to his earlier 
work, he points out that not only are liberals responsible for the 
current devolution of power to special interests, conservatives 
are as well. 
The other two chapters in this section are by Cass Sunstein 
and Edward Haefele. A newer contribution from Sunstein, 
which directly addressed some of the themes sounded earlier in 
the book, would have been most welcome. Disappointingly, 
however, the book includes a version of his almost decade-old 
article, Interest Groups in American Public Law, in which he 
demonstrates the importance of both the awareness of factions 
and the need for deliberation seen in Madison's theory, and ar-
gues that much of current law is based on this "Madisonian re-
publicanism." It is an excellent article, but many, if not most, of 
the readers of this book will already be familiar with it. Haefele's 
essay, on the other hand, comes from a completely different an-
gle in its attempt to identify the central features of the American 
regime. Self-government, civic virtue, and state-economy rela-
tions are three of the features identified and defended as of cen-
tral importance. The essay's most unusual feature is its 
discussion of a fourth feature-the importance of the secular-sa-
cred distinction in the United States. 
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One potential objection to this book is its lack of cohesion. 
This, however, is not a serious problem. To begin with, these au-
thors are essentially designing a new research program, and a 
range of opinions at this point is certainly to be expected. In 
addition, while these chapters show a fair amount of diversity, 
most of them do subscribe to the idea that we need to consider 
how to create institutions that lead to good regimes. Elkin and 
Soltan are to be credited for bringing together a collection of es-
says which manage, for the most part, to be both diverse and 
consistent. 
Other flaws are more serious. A primary purpose of the 
book is to convince readers that the primary purpose of political 
science ought to be to choose among regimes. Thus, in order to 
be a success, the book must convince us this is the case. But two 
nagging issues prevent the book from being convincing on these 
grounds. First, creating more desirable institutions is certainly a 
laudable goal. But the unanswered question is this: more desira-
ble to whom? The answer to this question, as social choice the-
ory has demonstrated, is not at all straightforward; yet it is barely 
discussed in this volume. Second, even if one accepts the argu-
ment (made most explicitly by Ceaser) that the only good social 
science is one that is normative, another question remains unan-
swered: How can we prescribe when we still have difficulty 
describing? This, too, is a troubling question, and unfortunately 
it also goes unaddressed. These were questions I had as I began 
reading the book, and they were questions I still had after having 
read it. 
This book makes for interesting reading for those of us in 
the mainstream of social science and political science, but I sus-
pect most will not come away convinced. The chapters by Elkin 
and Anderson, in particular, provide good overviews and argu-
ments. In addition, most of the chapters contain arguments 
presented at length elsewhere, so the book provides a nice intro-
duction to those scholars interested in the work of these authors 
and the development of the PEGS research agenda. Finally, the 
book is worth reading for the questions it raises and for the his-
torical background it provides. But ultimately it is more success-
ful at raising these questions than in answering them, or even 
demonstrating that our current state of knowledge allows for 
answers. 
